INTRODUCTION

Recent Mergers and Acquisitions (M&As) trend
indicates that cross-border M&As (CBMAs) are getting more popular as a form of investment. [I] More than 40 percent of the global foreign direct investments (FDI) flowed into the emerging market of which 85 percent were in the form of CBMAs. [2] . This is supported by Ref. [3] whereby CBMAs accounted for about 47 percent of the world wide M&A transactions in 2007, and [4] stated that the total value of CBMAs in developing Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, the Philippines, and South Korea (hereafter Korea). [5] .
Prior to the Asian financial crisis, foreign investors were explicitly prohibited from gaining a controlling stake in local firms, e.g in Korea and Malaysia. The financial crisis has triggered important policy changes on the expectation that CBMAs would speed up corporate and financial restructuring and facilitate faster economic recovery. Nevertheless, concerns have been raised on the risk of shifting ownership of important enterprises from domestic to foreign hands and whether the openness to trade and foreign investment makes developing countries more vulnerable to exploitation by foreign investors. [6] .
Despite the popularity of M&As for strategic growth in the corporate world and the interests of the policy makers in CBMAs, empirical studies in CBMAs are still sparse especially in the East Asian economies. In addition, previous studies have provided mixed results on the effect of CBMAs. [7, 8] . The effects of CBMAs and determinants that cause the variations to the post-CBMA performance in these countries after the crisis would be of value to many parties concerned. Thus, this study aims to investigate the effects of CBMAs and the possible causes of the variations in the post-CBMA performance of the target firms in the five East Asian countries, namely Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, the Philippines and South Korea. For this purpose, the ownership and target firms' characteristics (target firm performance, size and business relatedness) are examined. We hypothesize that firm specific information such as financial characteristics are related to the potential gains that bidders would expect to enjoy through the business combination. This group of variables provides bidders with information in the acquisition screening process, and thus their motives for the acquisitions can be derived. [9, 10] . In terms of the ownership characteristics of the firms, we hypothesize that it would have an impact on bidding firms' performance; large foreign shareholdings would exacerbate or mitigate agency conflicts. [ll, 12] . This paper is presented as follows.
The following section discusses a review of the literature and hypotheses development. This is followed by method and analysis of the results. Finally, this paper discusses and concludes the findings and provides suggestions for future research.
II. RELATED LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
A. Target Characteristics
There are many factors contributed to the post acquisition performance of the acquired firms. Generally, the characteristics of a target firm reflect the motivation of the bidding firms. For instance, if the targets performed poorly, managerial-disciplinary take-over would be a possible outcome. [13, 14] . The crisis in the Asian countries provides this opportunity as many of the corporations in these countries were in distressed condition and this corresponded to the "fire sale" phenomena as highlighted by [15] .
On the other hand, bidders may acquire targets with growth potential and good track record in terms of earning prior to the crisis to gain expertise as well as new markets in the countries concerned. the performance measurement will not be distorted by the external factors such as economic conditions. The control firms were identified by matching their 3-digit SIC codes to the acquirers' and also their sizes.
The independent variables include the characteristics of targets (pre-CBMA) and ownership characteristics of the acquired firms post-CBMAs. A four-step hierarchical analysis is used to isolate the effects of various determinants on the post-CBMA performance.
A. Data and Sample Selection
The initial CBMA list was identified from the Thomson One Banker M&A database for the five countries, namely Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Korea. This was to exclude portfolio investments so that the CBMAs had caused a change in control of the targets. The final sample yielded 114 targets due to some of the targets had their names changed after restructuring, being inactive in the database or had been delisted. These sectors were much distressed and were slow in recovery after the Asian financial crisis. [4] . Table 3 Centre to the issue is whether the openness to trade and foreign investment makes developing countries more vulnerable to exploitation by foreign investors as in [6] or that it helps in the process of economic recovery. This In conclusion, concerns on the openness to trade and foreign investment in developing countries which can result in exploitation by foreign investors as in [6] One of the ways is to retain the talents within the country [36] . CSSR 2010
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Management International Review, vol. 35, pp. 337-359, 1995 share before CBMA. LnTA pre is log total assets of target prior to CBMA, SICM is the Target's primary 4-digit SIC match with the acquirer's (Dummy= 1, otherwise = 0). MAJ indicates majority owned if the largest shareholders owned more than 50 per cent of the equity shares and owned by foreigners (Dummy= I, otherwise = 0), FAM indicates family ownership if the identity of the largest shareholder is an individual (Dummy= 1, otherwise = 0) while GOY denotes government ownership if the largest share equity belong to the government (Dummy= 1, otherwise = 0), and FOR represents foreign ownership (Dummy= 1, otherwise = 0), and Others (benvhmark) if it is other types of ownership. MAJxSTCM indicates the interaction effects of majority foreign ownership and relatedness of business while MAlxlnTApre indicates the interaction effect between majority foreign ownership and target size.
MAJxFCFSPRE indicates interaction effect of majority foreign ownership and pre-CBMA FCFS.
